বারবার ‘জাতীয় নিরাপত্তা’র ধোয়া তুলে সরকার পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রামের ওপর নতুন নতুন শর্ত চাপিয়ে দিচ্ছে। পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রাম ও সমতলে বসবাসকারী আদিবাসীদের নিয়ে নামকরণ রাজনীতির পর সরকার সাম্প্রতিক সময়ে বিদেশিদের পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রাম ভ্রমণের ওপর কঠিন শর্ত আরোপ করেছে। দুই বছর ধরে বাংলাদেশে বসবাসরত আদিবাসীদের পরিচিতি নিয়ে ব্যাপক তর্কবিতর্ক শুরু হয়। নির্বাচনী ইশতেহার থেকে সরে এসে এবং আদিবাসীদের সব দাবি অগ্রাহ্য করে সংবিধান সংশোধনীতে ক্ষুদ্র নৃগোষ্ঠী হিসেবে আদিবাসীদের প্রথমবারের মতো সংবিধানে স্বীকৃতি দেওয়া হয়।
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Wednesday, December 21, 2011
পার্বত্য চট্টগ্রাম ‘জাতীয় নিরাপত্তার’ স্বার্থে নতুন নতুন শর্তারোপ? জোবাইদা নাসরীন
Tuesday, September 06, 2011
Who is 'Indigenous?'
WASFIA NAZREEN elaborates on the concept of indigenousness in the context of Bangladesh.
----Wasfia Nazreen is a member of Drishtipat Writers' Collective (www.drishtipat.org/dpwriters) and was a delegate of Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) at the 10th session of United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII). She can be reached at wasfia@drishtipat.org. The article was published in http://www.thedailystar.net/forum/2011/September/who.htmThe recent debate on 'indigenousness' in the context of Bangladesh has thrown up many questions on the appropriateness of the 'indigenous' identity of the peoples of Bangladesh, particularly the Pahari (hill) peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The government line is that the Paharis are not indigenous to Bangladesh, while Bengalis are. On the other hand, the Jumma peoples and the Plains Adibashis insist that they are indigenous peoples.
Who is right? Who are the Indigenous -- the Adibashis or the Bengalis? Or are they both indigenous?
Context of indigenousness: Human rights vs. etymology
An informed discussion on the subject will not be possible unless we clarify the context of our discussion. The relevant context here is human rights and the framework necessarily has to be the one ascribed by that premier club of the world's sovereign states: the United Nations. Although our esteemed foreign minister is known to have cited dictionary meaning(s) of the term, 'indigenous', quoting them to be those who “belong to a particular place rather than coming to it from somewhere else”, the debate cannot be settled by referring to dictionaries, but by looking at the term's meaning as understood in the relevant UN instruments and processes and other international human-rights mechanisms, while paying appropriate attention to the political and legal contexts of Bangladesh.
And, of course, we must not ignore history. Let us therefore explore the history of settlements in Bangladesh, and the implications of the recent amendments of the constitution.
Ancestral backgrounds of the Adibashis
The most pertinent question in this respect is, were there peoples living in different parts of Bangladesh - and not necessarily spread over all parts of Bangladesh - before the arrival of the currently dominant groups (the Bengalis) in those parts of the country?
Citing the Government of Bangladesh's communication to him, the UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo wrote that the government regarded members of tribal and semi-tribal populations as indigenous on account of their descent from populations which are settled in specified geographical areas of the country (emphasis added).
Thus the question is, were the different Adibashi peoples settled in the different parts of the country such as the CHT (e.g., Chakma, Marma, Tripura), the Barind tract (e.g., Santal, Munda, Oroan), the Madhupur tract (Garo, Hajong) and so forth, before the Bengalis settled there?
Indigenousness of the CHT Adibashis (Jummas)
Historical records of the Portugese, Mughals and British, and oral and written accounts of the Jummas themselves clearly attest to the fact that all the 11 Jumma peoples were in existence in the CHT-Chittagong-Feni-Noakhali-Comilla region, not just in the hills but also in the plainlands, prior to conquest (in 1666, by the Mughals of a part of Chittagong, Feni-Noakhali, Comilla, etc., but excluding the present-day CHT). Suniti Bhushan Qanungo writes: “In prehistoric times Chittagong was inhabited successively by the Austro-Asiatic and the Mongoloid groups of peoples”. He writes further, “The Mughal conquest of Chittagong drove the Arakanese beyond the hill ranges, and vacated places were occupied by new settlers from within or outside the district. The Mughal government encouraged the colonization in northwestern Chittagong, which had been depopulated during the Arakanese regime. The new colonizers, mostly the inhabitants of Noakhali-Tripura-Comilla region were the latest settlers in the district”.
Portuguese accounts refer to “Chacomas”, separately from Bengal, Arakan and Tripura in the mid-16th century. Migration of Jummas to and from present-day Bangladesh, the Indian states of Tripura and Mizoram, and Myanmar happened for centuries. It was not a one-off event. Thus it is understandable why the CHT Regulation of 1900 defined an indigenous person of the CHT as “Chakma, [Marma] or a member of any Hill tribe indigenous to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Lushai Hills, Arakan Hill Tracts, or the State of Tripura”.
In contrast, Bengalis were the last to settle in the CHT.
Most importantly, the CHT was not part of Bengal until after British advent. Eminent historians and sociologists therefore have noted the following: “In 1860 the British occupied the hills to the east of Chittagong and annexed them to their colonial empire. For the first time in their history, the Chittagong hills were administered from Bengal. Before that time, political power in the hills had been dispersed among many chiefs.”
Indigenousness of the Plains Adibashis
As in the case of the CHT, in the plains region as well, there is no record of Adibashis having displaced Bengalis and settled in their present locations. The Santal and Oraon made the Barind tract inhabitable and converted harsh terrain into paddy lands. Similar settlements were made by Rakhaing (Patuakhali-Barguna), Garo and Khasi (Mymensingh-Sylhet), but not by conquering and displacing Bengalis!
As in the case of the CHT, the plains Adibashis were also present in Bangladesh from before there were written histories, imperial conquests and colonisation.
Even today, despite the de-recognition, and subsequent non-recognition by the state, it is the traditional institutions that these peoples turn to for resolving their internal disputes and for carrying out other cultural activities (Manjhi: Santall, Nokma: Garo, Myntri: Khasi). They do not turn to the mainstream state-centric institutions, unlike the Bengali peoples.
Indigenousness of Bengalis
Of course, Bengalis have also lived in different parts of the plains and delta areas for centuries. Bengalis, however, have not ventured into the hill and forest areas until relatively recently. And going back to the earliest history of Bengal, prior to the arrival of the Indo-European and Dravidian-speaking peoples, the inhabitants of Bengal included several of the peoples who are claiming indigenous identity.
But the crucial point here is that by having assimilated into the dominant groups and adopting the dominant identity (regardless of the religious and nationalist aspects of that identity) Bengalis can no longer claim the indigenous mantle as it is understood in the human rights context. The indigenous concept only makes sense when the peoples are "non-dominant" in statecraft and otherwise.
Contrary to the popular belief portrayed in the media, having an 'indigenous' status does not give anyone privileges of any sort over and above that of other citizens. Essentially, it means the recognition of their full participatory rights as citizens, keeping in mind the exclusion and discrimination historically meted out to them in the process of state-formation, nation building and development, which Bengalis have enjoyed from the formation of the State. It also means the creation of an enabling environment, in which they may preserve their distinctive cultural identities, which are threatened on account of their marginal situations from the beginning of State formation.
The Debate at the UN Permanent Forum and Economic and Social Council
After the decision was taken at the ECOSOC to adopt the report of the 10th session of UNPFII, GoB was quick to put up a face-saving diplomatic response, with only China, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia showing sympathy for GoB's position. Never mind the human-rights records of the above-mentioned countries!
The Foreign Ministry's PR campaign also reported that Russia had leaned towards GoB's concern, but in fact, the position taken by Russia is just a known cautious position on IP related matters -- nothing new, and they say something like this at ECOSOC every year. What GoB, quite understandably suppressed in the media -- is the overwhelming rejection of GoB's views by states at ECOSOC of it's two major requests: 1) to agree that PFII had no mandate to discuss the CHT Accord, on the ground that the CHT Jummas were not indigenous peoples; and 2) to delete two paragraphs from the PFII's report concerning human rights violation by GoB security personnel and prevention of peacekeeping duties by HR violators.
Several news sources have referred that “Raja Devasish Roy 'led' a 12-strong team to UNPFII” -- which is factually incorrect. Raja Devasish Roy is one of the 16 Expert Members at the PFII, and it is not one of those Climate or Biodiversity conferences where he 'led' a team from Bangladesh (including Government officials) to represent our country. As an expert member at the Permanent Forum, he is a voice of entire Asia, appointed by the ECOSOC after securing an overwhelming number of votes from Indigenous organisations across the continent.
At the UNPFII, the participants from Bangladesh represented several independent organisations of our country. I was one of those 12 participants at the 10th session of UNPFII, and my organisation presented its statement on the status of the implementation of the CHT Accord, and the state of human-rights in CHT as a result of the delay in the implementation of the Peace Accord. With all due respect to Raja Devasish, I or the other Bangladeshi civil society members did not attend the PFII under his leadership. We were each sent by individual, independent organisations to participate, in my particular case, an ECOSOC-accredited member, the Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK). When the media portrays such absurd connection to his leadership roles and those who attended the PFII in our individual capacity and merits, it is feeding into an already convoluted situation fed by racist and communalist misinformation campaign.
Indigenousness in UN instruments and practices
Definition
According to the UN the most fruitful approach is to identify, rather than formally define indigenous peoples and hence there is no set definition of indigenous peoples in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. However, International laws do not define minorities either. The “working definition” of indigenous peoples by José R Martínez Cobo has attained the status of a near-formal definition in the context of UN and International human rights jurisprudence. Cobo writes: “Indigenous communities, peopless and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peopless, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system.” (My emphasis added)
The ILO Conventions 107 (ratified by GoB)
We should be examining first and foremost the concept in relation to the ILO Convention on Indigenous & Tribal Populations (Convention No. 107) of 1957, which Bangladesh ratified in June, 1972, under the leadership of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, about six months before the Constitution of Bangladesh was adopted.
2.1. Pre-colonisation or pre-conquest social, cultural and economic institutions
As a collective entity, Bengalis live less in conformity with the “social, economic and cultural institutions” of the time of their pre-colonisation or pre-conquest period ancestors, and more in conformity with “the institutions of the nation to which they belong”, and hence they cannot be regarded as indigenous within the meaning of Convention 107.
In contrast, hill communities of the CHT, and Adibashi groups of the plains, “irrespective of their legal status” are quite the opposite. Traditional institutions in the CHT are formally recognized by law, and while those in the plains are not -- still conform to their ancestral institutions' traditions norms and mores.
In the case of “economic institutions”, Bengalis clearly do not retain very many practices of the pre-colonial or pre-conquest period, unlike Pahari groups, for example collective forest management, subsistence-oriented jum or “shifting” cultivation, etc.
2.2. Indigenous are tribal
It is clear from the wording of ILO Convention No. 107 that 'indigenous' and 'tribal' population groups are both referred to as “tribal or semi-tribal” populations. Therefore, indigenous populations are those among the tribal and semi-tribal population groups who “[are descended] from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization and which, irrespective of their legal status, live more in conformity with the social, economic and cultural institutions of that time than with the institutions of the nation to which they belong”.
2.3. Social, economic and other position of disadvantage
The concept of tribal and semi-tribal population groups has been related in this convention with “social and economic conditions [that] are at a less advanced [read disadvantaged] stage than the stage reached by the other sections of the national community”, and a “status [that] is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations”.
The concept of indigenous peoples is meaningless in the case of Bengalis from a human rights perspective because Bengalis are at the helm of state power, while the Adibashis were, and still are, substantively, the 'excluded' citizens, marginalised and disadvantaged.
GoB at the UN in the past
From the final report on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations submitted on June 20, 1982 to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations by Mr. José Martínez Cobo, a Special Rapporteur, it is documented that the then Bangladesh Government clearly recognised the existence of the Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh. The report looked at a number of criteria in defining Indigenous Peoples, and reported how different governments define the Indigenous Peoples in their countries.
Let's look at how the then Bangladesh Government defined and recognised the Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh. Under the Ancestry criteria: “In Bangladesh, the Government states that the members of Tribal or Semi-tribal populations are regarded as indigenous “on account of their descent from the populations which are settled in specified geographical areas of the country.” (Emphasis added).” Under the Culture and Language criteria: “In Bangladesh some of these isolated or marginal groups are said to “speak a language of their own, have their own dances, music and love songs and a uniform style of home, dress, food and customs distinct from the other tribes”, in some cases also including religions which may be “a mixture of Buddhism and totemism”. Several of these groups are described as “small communities leading a life undisturbed by alien influences” for a very long time “because of the heavy monsoon that cuts off their area from the outside world for much of the year.”” Several similar recognitions by the GoB can be found in the historic document in the link provided.
The 15th Amendment terminology and why it does not work?
- Upajati
Anyone who is fluent in English and Bengali will find it humorous that the terms 'tribe/tribal' can even remotely be translated to the word 'Upa-jati' -- literally meaning 'sub-nation' or 'sub-ethnic groups.' Who is the sub-group here and who is the larger ethnic group? Are we calling the Adibashis the sub-groups of Bengalis?
-Khudro jatishotta
The term 'khudro jati-shotta' may seem more respectable towards the separate cultural entity of the non-Bengali peoples, but it is nevertheless, problematic, as there is a clear distinction of hierarchical division of peoples (smaller and greater!).
-Khudro nrigoshthi
“Khudro nri-goshthi” or small ethnic groups is also problematic. In the first place, the indigenous peoples and the Bengali peoples are both ethnic groups or ethnic communities, and the 'smallness' of the population of the indigenous peoples should not be the basis to distinguish between the different ethnic groups.
-Khudro shomprodai
Our honourable FM, Dipu Moni mentioned that when the Indigenous peoples are only 1.2% of the total population, giving them a special and 'elevated' identity cannot be in the national interest of our country. By this point, one must see how the Government is clearly stuck on the word “Khudro” -- potent in power and paralysed by fear. Khudro shomprodai is also problematic on account of the reference to smallness. Without the khudro, this term is not disparaging.
Nevertheless, khudro (small) or brihot (large), the constitution refers to jatishotta. Jatishotta is surely either a peoples or nation, in English. And jatishottahood, peoplehood or nationhood has nothing to do with the size or population of the group concerned and of their indigenous or other status. At the same time, deleting 'indigenous' and all related phrases from Government documents will neither erase the consciousness of those who are Indigenous, nor affect the conscience of those who have been fighting with them.
The spirit of the CHT Regulation and customary laws are embedded in the customs of Bangladesh, which cannot be uprooted merely by a change of terms. In an important case before the Supreme Court on the succession of the Bohmong chieftain-ship, the court stated that neither the GoB nor the Court had the right to interfere with customary laws. Thus the Customary laws of the Indigenous Peoples of Bangladesh are now part of the customs of the Republic and cannot arbitrarily be revoked through mere legislation, particularly where that contravenes the constitutional tenets of non-discrimination.
Having said that, the entire exercise smacks of crass and feudal times discriminatory acts. It would be equivalent to legislation in Europe and America -- or this country for that matter -- to overturn the positive legal developments regarding non-discrimination on race, gender and so forth. If GoB wants to continue to be the laughing-stock in the world podium of progressiveness -- the curtains are raised, refreshments have sold-out… all are queuing up for some good laughs, at the expense of our national image.
1. Ethnic minority, not indigenous people, FM tells diplomats, editors, Daily Star, July 27, 2011.
2. Commission on Human Rights, Study of the problem of discrimination against Indigenous Populations, Jose R. Martinez Cobo (1982: paragraph 61).
3. Suniti Bhushan Qanungo, A History of Chittagong, Vol 1, published by Dipankar Qanungo, Chittagong, 1988, p. 20.
4. Ibid, p. 21.
5. S. N. H. Rizvi (ed), East Pakistan District Gazetteers: Chittagong, Government of East Pakistan, Services and General Administration Department, East Pakistan Government Press, Dacca, 1970, p. 75.
6. Willem van Schendel, Wolfgang Mey & Aditya Kumar Dewan, The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Living in a Borderland, White Lotus Press, Bangkok, 2000, p. 25.
7. Chakma Raja decries non-recognition, Sun, 29/05/2011 by priyodesk; News Source: The New Age
8. Article 1(1)(b), ILO Convention No. 107.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Article 1(1)(a), ILO Convention No. 107.
13. The URL address of the report is http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/spdaip.html
14. Page 15 of E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6, No: 61.
15. Page 18 of E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6, No: 86.
16. Aung Shwe Prue Chowdhury v. Kyaw Sain Prue Chowdhury & Others (50 DLR AD (1998) 73)
Monday, December 06, 2010
On the 13th anniversary of the signing of the CHT Accord-Mr. MANGAL KUMAR CHAKMA evaluates its partial implementation
In order to resolve the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) problem through political and peaceful means, the CHT Accord, popularly known as CHT Peace Accord was signed between the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) on December 2, 1997. This Accord was achieved after a series of dialogues between the government and PCJSS. This Accord paves the way for re-introducing special government system in CHT.
It is mentionable that the CHT is a region inhabited by the indigenous Jumma peoples. During pre-colonial period, this region maintained its sovereignty under its own feudal kings. After inclusion of this region under the British Empire in 1860, the British government enacted the CHT Regulation of 1900 to preserve a separate administrative status for the Jumma peoples of this region. Later, the Pakistan government recognised the CHT Regulation of 1900 to be in effect under its 1956 constitution, preserving the status of the CHT as a region with a separate administrative system. The second Pakistani constitution of 1962 also used the term "tribal region" to recognise the CHT as a special region.
In 1964, when the Tribal Area status of the CHT was revoked in the Constitution of Pakistan, despite demands from the Jumma peoples, the special status of the region was not revived. Then in 1972, the demands of the late M N Larma for constitutional safeguards for the CHT and recognition of the identities of the indigenous peoples of the CHT fell on deaf years. Hence, PCJSS launched an armed struggle for right to self-determination since 1976 onwards when all democratic avenues failed to draw the attention of the government.
Though the armed struggle continued for about two and a half decades, the PCJSS always kept open the path for a political solution to the CHT issue by peaceful means. Consequently, formal negotiations started in 1985 with the government of General Ershad. Finally, the historic CHT Peace Accord was signed with the Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina in 1997.
The CHT Accord had ended the decades-long fierce armed conflict between the Jumma people and the Government of Bangladesh. This Accord has laid down a basis upon which to bring forth people-oriented development in the CHT.
Though the then Awami League government signed the CHT Peace Accord, the regime as a whole showed a lack of seriousness in implementing the Accord. It nevertheless took several initiatives toward implementing it. Just after the signing of the Accord, some matters have been implemented, including the formulation of some of the related laws. This has created the practical basis for the implementation of the Accord. Formulation of the CHT Regional Council Act (CHTRC) and three Hill District Council Acts, establishment of the CHT Affairs Ministry, repatriation of the Jumma refugees from India are some of the matters that have been implemented.
In fact, though the Regional Council Act and the three Hill District Council Acts were enacted, they were never properly enforced, so the special administrative system with CHT Regional Council and three Hill District Councils (HDCs) could never be made effective. The CHTRC is expected to be the final authority with regards to development and administration in the CHT. In practice, due to lack of political support from the successive governments, the CHTRC has not been able to exercise its full authority over the CHT. Similarly, the HDCs have not been empowered yet by the government to exercise their full authority in their respective districts.
The temporary camps of the armed forces are yet to be closed down as per CHT Accord; rather, de facto military rule was imposed under the name of "Operation Uttoron". The Jumma refugees who returned from India and the internally displaced Jumma people were not rehabilitated, rather, Bengali settlers were included as internally displaced people and efforts were made to rehabilitate them in the CHT in violation of the Accord.
Though the Land Commission was formed, it was unable to resolve any land disputes and the Land Commission Act was passed with provisions that were contradictory to the Accord. In addition, present chairman of the Land Commission declared to conduct a land survey in violation of the provisions of the Accord and continues to adopt decisions without holding meetings with the members of the Commission.
The provision vesting the circle chiefs with exclusive powers to grant permanent resident certificates was not enforced; instead, the deputy commissioners were given the power to issue permanent resident certificates violating the CHT Accord. Land leases previously given to non-permanent residents were not cancelled and instead outsiders were given new leases in violation of the Accord. Voter lists for the CHT were not prepared only with permanent residents but included outsiders. The provision to provide employment to permanent residents of the CHT with priority for Jumma people in all forms of civil service in the CHT was also not followed. The above are some of the unimplemented provisions that particularly deserve attention.
It is a matter of great hope that the grand alliance led by the Awami League came to power in the general election held in December 2008. The Awami League had promised in its election manifesto that it would fully implement the CHT Accord. However, almost two years have passed and the present government is yet to take effective steps to implement the CHT Accord.
Hence, no basic changes have been achieved during the tenure of the present government. Rather, there has been hardly any positive development in the overall situation in the CHT. Expansion of settlements and forcible land grabbing by the Bengali settlers with the support of military and civil administration continue unabated in all the three districts of CHT.
As a result, though more than 13 years have passed after signing of the Accord, most of the provisions, especially the main issues of the Accord, such as preservation of tribal-inhabited characteristics of CHT region, effective enforcement of the three HDCs and CHT Regional Council Act, resolution of land disputes through Land Commission, rehabilitation of returnee Jumma refugees and internally displaced Jumma families, withdrawal of temporary camps of security forces and military administration, preparing voter list only with the permanent residents of CHT, rehabilitation of the Bengali settlers outside CHT, etc., have either been partially implemented or left unimplemented.
Many powerful influences are standing in the way of implementation of the CHT Accord. Of these, the most important is the government's lack of strong political commitment for implementation of the Accord. Since its signing, the successive governments showed little sincerity or goodwill in implementing the Accord.
Another obstacle to the CHT Accord implementation process is the anti-accord role played by the military forces deployed in the CHT as well as government employees at the level of the three hill districts as well as the sub-district level. They in general do not wish for the CHT Accord to be implemented. A form of military administration under the name of "Operation Uttoron" continues to this day in the CHT. Though some of the military officers deployed in the CHT do support the Accord, other powerful quarters can still be seen to be active in opposing it.
Yet another obstacle to implementation of the Accord is the presence of fundamentalist and extreme communalist organisations in CHT. These fundamentalist organisations have been assisting the Bengali settlers in carrying out communal attacks on Jumma peoples in order to prevent implementation of the Accord.
The role of the CHT Affairs Ministry (MOCHTA) has also not been positive with regard to implementation of the CHT Accord. The idiosyncratic mindset of the bureaucrats of the CHT Ministry deeply affected by a chauvinistic mentality is largely responsible for the total non-cooperation for implementation of the Accord. Almost all the officers and employees at the MoCHTA continue to be non-indigenous persons who have only superficial exposure and understanding of the complexities of the region.
Under the circumstances, chaos and confusion reign supreme in the region instead of peace and normalcy. It will not be possible to implement the CHT Accord fully and properly unless these obstacles are removed. Implementation of the CHT Accord is the only way to achieve a lasting political solution to the CHT issue.
In order to resolve the CHT problem through political and peaceful means and to establish the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of indigenous peoples of the region, the implementation of the CHT Peace Accord is key. Without proper and speedy implementation of the CHT Peace Accord, good governance and rule of law in the CHT will remain elusive.
Mangal Kumar Chakma is Publicity and Information Secretary of Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti
In order to resolve the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) problem through political and peaceful means, the CHT Accord, popularly known as CHT Peace Accord was signed between the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) on December 2, 1997. This Accord was achieved after a series of dialogues between the government and PCJSS. This Accord paves the way for re-introducing special government system in CHT.
It is mentionable that the CHT is a region inhabited by the indigenous Jumma peoples. During pre-colonial period, this region maintained its sovereignty under its own feudal kings. After inclusion of this region under the British Empire in 1860, the British government enacted the CHT Regulation of 1900 to preserve a separate administrative status for the Jumma peoples of this region. Later, the Pakistan government recognised the CHT Regulation of 1900 to be in effect under its 1956 constitution, preserving the status of the CHT as a region with a separate administrative system. The second Pakistani constitution of 1962 also used the term "tribal region" to recognise the CHT as a special region.
In 1964, when the Tribal Area status of the CHT was revoked in the Constitution of Pakistan, despite demands from the Jumma peoples, the special status of the region was not revived. Then in 1972, the demands of the late M N Larma for constitutional safeguards for the CHT and recognition of the identities of the indigenous peoples of the CHT fell on deaf years. Hence, PCJSS launched an armed struggle for right to self-determination since 1976 onwards when all democratic avenues failed to draw the attention of the government.
Though the armed struggle continued for about two and a half decades, the PCJSS always kept open the path for a political solution to the CHT issue by peaceful means. Consequently, formal negotiations started in 1985 with the government of General Ershad. Finally, the historic CHT Peace Accord was signed with the Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina in 1997.
The CHT Accord had ended the decades-long fierce armed conflict between the Jumma people and the Government of Bangladesh. This Accord has laid down a basis upon which to bring forth people-oriented development in the CHT.
Though the then Awami League government signed the CHT Peace Accord, the regime as a whole showed a lack of seriousness in implementing the Accord. It nevertheless took several initiatives toward implementing it. Just after the signing of the Accord, some matters have been implemented, including the formulation of some of the related laws. This has created the practical basis for the implementation of the Accord. Formulation of the CHT Regional Council Act (CHTRC) and three Hill District Council Acts, establishment of the CHT Affairs Ministry, repatriation of the Jumma refugees from India are some of the matters that have been implemented.
In fact, though the Regional Council Act and the three Hill District Council Acts were enacted, they were never properly enforced, so the special administrative system with CHT Regional Council and three Hill District Councils (HDCs) could never be made effective. The CHTRC is expected to be the final authority with regards to development and administration in the CHT. In practice, due to lack of political support from the successive governments, the CHTRC has not been able to exercise its full authority over the CHT. Similarly, the HDCs have not been empowered yet by the government to exercise their full authority in their respective districts.
The temporary camps of the armed forces are yet to be closed down as per CHT Accord; rather, de facto military rule was imposed under the name of "Operation Uttoron". The Jumma refugees who returned from India and the internally displaced Jumma people were not rehabilitated, rather, Bengali settlers were included as internally displaced people and efforts were made to rehabilitate them in the CHT in violation of the Accord.
Though the Land Commission was formed, it was unable to resolve any land disputes and the Land Commission Act was passed with provisions that were contradictory to the Accord. In addition, present chairman of the Land Commission declared to conduct a land survey in violation of the provisions of the Accord and continues to adopt decisions without holding meetings with the members of the Commission.
The provision vesting the circle chiefs with exclusive powers to grant permanent resident certificates was not enforced; instead, the deputy commissioners were given the power to issue permanent resident certificates violating the CHT Accord. Land leases previously given to non-permanent residents were not cancelled and instead outsiders were given new leases in violation of the Accord. Voter lists for the CHT were not prepared only with permanent residents but included outsiders. The provision to provide employment to permanent residents of the CHT with priority for Jumma people in all forms of civil service in the CHT was also not followed. The above are some of the unimplemented provisions that particularly deserve attention.
It is a matter of great hope that the grand alliance led by the Awami League came to power in the general election held in December 2008. The Awami League had promised in its election manifesto that it would fully implement the CHT Accord. However, almost two years have passed and the present government is yet to take effective steps to implement the CHT Accord.
Hence, no basic changes have been achieved during the tenure of the present government. Rather, there has been hardly any positive development in the overall situation in the CHT. Expansion of settlements and forcible land grabbing by the Bengali settlers with the support of military and civil administration continue unabated in all the three districts of CHT.
As a result, though more than 13 years have passed after signing of the Accord, most of the provisions, especially the main issues of the Accord, such as preservation of tribal-inhabited characteristics of CHT region, effective enforcement of the three HDCs and CHT Regional Council Act, resolution of land disputes through Land Commission, rehabilitation of returnee Jumma refugees and internally displaced Jumma families, withdrawal of temporary camps of security forces and military administration, preparing voter list only with the permanent residents of CHT, rehabilitation of the Bengali settlers outside CHT, etc., have either been partially implemented or left unimplemented.
Many powerful influences are standing in the way of implementation of the CHT Accord. Of these, the most important is the government's lack of strong political commitment for implementation of the Accord. Since its signing, the successive governments showed little sincerity or goodwill in implementing the Accord.
Another obstacle to the CHT Accord implementation process is the anti-accord role played by the military forces deployed in the CHT as well as government employees at the level of the three hill districts as well as the sub-district level. They in general do not wish for the CHT Accord to be implemented. A form of military administration under the name of "Operation Uttoron" continues to this day in the CHT. Though some of the military officers deployed in the CHT do support the Accord, other powerful quarters can still be seen to be active in opposing it.
Yet another obstacle to implementation of the Accord is the presence of fundamentalist and extreme communalist organisations in CHT. These fundamentalist organisations have been assisting the Bengali settlers in carrying out communal attacks on Jumma peoples in order to prevent implementation of the Accord.
The role of the CHT Affairs Ministry (MOCHTA) has also not been positive with regard to implementation of the CHT Accord. The idiosyncratic mindset of the bureaucrats of the CHT Ministry deeply affected by a chauvinistic mentality is largely responsible for the total non-cooperation for implementation of the Accord. Almost all the officers and employees at the MoCHTA continue to be non-indigenous persons who have only superficial exposure and understanding of the complexities of the region.
Under the circumstances, chaos and confusion reign supreme in the region instead of peace and normalcy. It will not be possible to implement the CHT Accord fully and properly unless these obstacles are removed. Implementation of the CHT Accord is the only way to achieve a lasting political solution to the CHT issue.
In order to resolve the CHT problem through political and peaceful means and to establish the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of indigenous peoples of the region, the implementation of the CHT Peace Accord is key. Without proper and speedy implementation of the CHT Peace Accord, good governance and rule of law in the CHT will remain elusive.
Mangal Kumar Chakma is Publicity and Information Secretary of Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti
Sunday, December 05, 2010
Women and climate change-Oxfam report
When natural disasters strike, they hit poor communities first and worst. And since women make up an estimated 70 percent of those living below the poverty line, they are most likely to bear the heaviest burdens.
Additionally, women are responsible for the majority of food production in many developing countries despite typically having restricted access to markets, land and credit. This lack of access means they face a double whammy: they are more dependent on the natural resources, that are under threat from climate change, but they are limited in what they can do to cope.
Women are also often left out of planning and management processes regarding global climate institutions and finance, even though they are at times in the best position to provide solutions.
COP decisions in Cancun can directly address these inequalities and engage women as critical agents of change.
State of play
-Key negotiating texts in the long-term cooperative action track (LCA) have retained references to women and gender equality in areas such as shared vision, adaptation, and technology transfer. These references were originally added to the text by countries in negotiating sessions leading up to COP 15 in Copenhagen.
-In other key negotiating texts particularly Finance there are no references to gender. It is critical to address this gap, especially taking gender into consideration in the policies and programs of a Global Climate Fund, including equal access to financing, and ensuring equitable gender representation on the board of that Fund.
Gender equality at Cancun and beyond
Gender equality is integral to meeting global goals on poverty eradication and sustainable development. A gender perspective should be explicitly included in any texts on climate change adaptation, mitigation, technology, and finance, recognizing gender-differentiated impacts, as well as women's and men's capacity to participate and act as agents for change in climate change solutions. Specifically, parties in Cancun must ensure that:
-Language in key sections of the LCA text are retained pertaining to shared vision, adaptation, capacity building, and development and transfer of technologies. These references recognize the differentiated impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations, groups and communities, prioritize the most vulnerable in channelling resources, and promote the active participation of women in decision-making, planning, implementation and evaluation measures.
-A Global Climate Fund must be established that reflects principles of gender equality at all levels. The Fund should have equality of gender representation on its Board and should ensure accessibility of its financing to women and other marginalised groups. Resources from the climate finance mechanism need to be delivered in a way that is accessible and driven by the engagement of developing country governments and citizens, particularly women. Such a Fund should have separate windows or sub-funds for adaptation and mitigation. In addition, the Global Climate Fund should specifically provide for:
i)full participation of affected communities and populations, including women, in the design and implementation of programs and activities, and mechanisms to ensure accountability to these populations; and
-ii)take gender into account in all policies and programs, including ensuring equal access to financing.
-Developed countries must follow-through on the delivery of fast-start and long-term finance to developing countries to support adaptation and mitigation actions in developing countries. All of the finance delivered for adaptation needs must come from public sources in the form of grants to ensure that resources are available to and effectively directed toward women and other marginalized communities.
Contacts: www.oxfam.org
Key reasons why gender equality must be incorporated into a global climate agreement
-Women are often the linchpins of communities, families, and local economies. They are the key providers for the household, and raise the children, care for the old and the sick. As a result, they are on the front lines of the devastating effects of climate change, and largely define the community's ability to adapt or recover from a disaster.
-Women produce up to 60 to 80 percent of the food in most developing countries. They regularly do the jobs, such as cultivating crops, and collecting water and fuel, which are most affected by climate change. Women's entrepreneurship in agriculture could make significant contributions to both climate adaptation.
-Women are disproportionately represented among the poor, making up roughly 70% of those living below the poverty line. They often have less access to resources and essential services before and after disaster strikes, and are more likely to die during natural disasters than men.• Women often struggle to get their voices heard in the climate debate. Given their central role in the family and community, women have invaluable knowledge about creating and implementing innovative ways to adapt to a changing climate, yet their opinions and experience are all too often overlooked.
-Other international agreements specifically address gender. Of the legally binding agreements that resulted from the 1992 Earth Summit, the UNFCCC is the only convention not to incorporate gender issues. The Convention on Biological Diversity has incorporated a gender plan of action that recognizes women's traditional knowledge and access to land assets
Thursday, December 02, 2010
Thursday, November 25, 2010
Food import: For whom?
Written by M. Miz
anur Rahman and Shammunul Islam are Masters of Development Studies, University of Dhaka
Recently, the government took a decision not to buy rice from the farmers but to import it from abroad. The reason given is that rice price is already high in the market. The decision is not as simple as it looks. Agricultural price policy is very crucial for a country as 60% of the population depend directly on agriculture.
Stabilising food grain market is important for any government for many reasons, of which the two main ones are (i) if the farmers do not get the proper price, they will lose their incentive for agricultural production next year and (ii) if the food grain price is too high, the industrial sector will have to lose their profit as higher price tends to bring an increase in wages. Both of these two situations can be disastrous for our country.
Considering the interests of both the farmers and the industrialists is equally important. If the government cannot give proper price to the farmers for their food grains, they may even move to the cash crops and the food security of our country will be threatened. In the northern part and in the hill tracts many farmers have turned to cultivating tobacco, and in the southern part they have taken up shrimp farming, which is not a good signal for our country.
A study shows that by 2050, 17% of the South Asian people will suffer food crisis, and by 2100 the number will rise to 35% (Basak, 2010). The World Bank estimates that 882 million people in developing countries are facing food insecurity in 2010. This is alarming indeed for all of us, and ensuring food security should be of utmost importance for the government as there is distressing increase of population as well as demand for food.
To keep the farmers in the agricultural production system the government usually follows either of two major policies -- price support or input subsidy. In developing countries like Bangladesh, both policies are often adopted. The government has allocated Tk.4,006 crore for agricultural input subsidy (in the last FY, it was Tk.4,200 crore). This was done so that the input cost remained low and rice price in the market could cover or exceed the input cost. But, because of the weak distribution system and dealership management, and corruption at every stage, farmers cannot reap the benefit.
Along with input subsidy, the government buys rice from the farmers directly at an assured price. It keeps the food grain market stable as the government fixes the floor price of the food grains. This system can easily help in ensuring fair price for the farmers.
Now let us look at what will happen because of the decision of not buying rice from the farmers, and see how logical it is.
First of all, we have to bear in mind that rice price in any market in the country and the price received by the farmers are not the same. Last year, farmers got a maximum of Tk.600 for a maund of rice, but in the market we got prepared rice of the same amount (25 kg of prepared rice is produced from one maund of rice) almost Tk.1,000. Almost Tk.600 goes into the pockets of the middlemen who buy rice from the field, prepare it, transport it and sell it in the market.
This new type of business emerged in the villages only one and half decades ago, and now it is rising fast. It is the middlemen not the farmers who are earning a huge amount of money from food grains. So high price in the market does not indicate that farmers are getting the right price.
The government has 8 lakh metric tonnes of food grains in stock, and has decided to import another eight lakh metric tonnes from abroad. This will increase the profit of the middlemen. There is no farmers' union in any locality of our country, but middlemen can dictate the terms by creating a union among themselves. When the government is not the buyer, these businessmen will easily control the market and it will be the farmers who will lose out again. This, in turn, will discourage them from producing food grains next year.
In India, inflation in food price was 20% in FY 2009-10. Even then, Haryana Chief Minister Bhupindar Singh Hooda urged the central government to peg the minimum support price of food grains at 50% higher than the actual cost of cultivation. But, Bangladesh, with a food inflation of 9.72% (as of September, 2010), is thinking of not buying rice, which raises the question as to why we should take away price support when it has the potential of becoming a boon for our agricultural sector.
In creating a better food grain policy it is imperative to look at the entire system of food production, food procurement and the release and distribution of food. There are basically two motives for food grain procurement by the state -- to provide food security to the vulnerable population and to smooth out food grain price fluctuation from year to year. So, there are plenty of things to be considered before taking any decision concerning agriculture and food grain as the entire population is affected by it.
anur Rahman and Shammunul Islam are Masters of Development Studies, University of DhakaRecently, the government took a decision not to buy rice from the farmers but to import it from abroad. The reason given is that rice price is already high in the market. The decision is not as simple as it looks. Agricultural price policy is very crucial for a country as 60% of the population depend directly on agriculture.
Stabilising food grain market is important for any government for many reasons, of which the two main ones are (i) if the farmers do not get the proper price, they will lose their incentive for agricultural production next year and (ii) if the food grain price is too high, the industrial sector will have to lose their profit as higher price tends to bring an increase in wages. Both of these two situations can be disastrous for our country.
Considering the interests of both the farmers and the industrialists is equally important. If the government cannot give proper price to the farmers for their food grains, they may even move to the cash crops and the food security of our country will be threatened. In the northern part and in the hill tracts many farmers have turned to cultivating tobacco, and in the southern part they have taken up shrimp farming, which is not a good signal for our country.
A study shows that by 2050, 17% of the South Asian people will suffer food crisis, and by 2100 the number will rise to 35% (Basak, 2010). The World Bank estimates that 882 million people in developing countries are facing food insecurity in 2010. This is alarming indeed for all of us, and ensuring food security should be of utmost importance for the government as there is distressing increase of population as well as demand for food.
To keep the farmers in the agricultural production system the government usually follows either of two major policies -- price support or input subsidy. In developing countries like Bangladesh, both policies are often adopted. The government has allocated Tk.4,006 crore for agricultural input subsidy (in the last FY, it was Tk.4,200 crore). This was done so that the input cost remained low and rice price in the market could cover or exceed the input cost. But, because of the weak distribution system and dealership management, and corruption at every stage, farmers cannot reap the benefit.
Along with input subsidy, the government buys rice from the farmers directly at an assured price. It keeps the food grain market stable as the government fixes the floor price of the food grains. This system can easily help in ensuring fair price for the farmers.
Now let us look at what will happen because of the decision of not buying rice from the farmers, and see how logical it is.
First of all, we have to bear in mind that rice price in any market in the country and the price received by the farmers are not the same. Last year, farmers got a maximum of Tk.600 for a maund of rice, but in the market we got prepared rice of the same amount (25 kg of prepared rice is produced from one maund of rice) almost Tk.1,000. Almost Tk.600 goes into the pockets of the middlemen who buy rice from the field, prepare it, transport it and sell it in the market.
This new type of business emerged in the villages only one and half decades ago, and now it is rising fast. It is the middlemen not the farmers who are earning a huge amount of money from food grains. So high price in the market does not indicate that farmers are getting the right price.
The government has 8 lakh metric tonnes of food grains in stock, and has decided to import another eight lakh metric tonnes from abroad. This will increase the profit of the middlemen. There is no farmers' union in any locality of our country, but middlemen can dictate the terms by creating a union among themselves. When the government is not the buyer, these businessmen will easily control the market and it will be the farmers who will lose out again. This, in turn, will discourage them from producing food grains next year.
In India, inflation in food price was 20% in FY 2009-10. Even then, Haryana Chief Minister Bhupindar Singh Hooda urged the central government to peg the minimum support price of food grains at 50% higher than the actual cost of cultivation. But, Bangladesh, with a food inflation of 9.72% (as of September, 2010), is thinking of not buying rice, which raises the question as to why we should take away price support when it has the potential of becoming a boon for our agricultural sector.
In creating a better food grain policy it is imperative to look at the entire system of food production, food procurement and the release and distribution of food. There are basically two motives for food grain procurement by the state -- to provide food security to the vulnerable population and to smooth out food grain price fluctuation from year to year. So, there are plenty of things to be considered before taking any decision concerning agriculture and food grain as the entire population is affected by it.
Wednesday, November 24, 2010
Challenges to our food security
M. Abdul Latif Mondal
While speaking at a function on November 10 for distribution of agro inputs to flash-flood affected farmers of haor area under Taherpur upazila in Sunamganj district, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said: "We don't want to see that a single person is starving, we are relentlessly working for ensuring food security for every person," adding that her government took "massive programmes including lowering of fertiliser prices for development of agriculture sector and providing huge subsidy to bring agro inputs to the doorsteps of farmers."
Food security is basically defined as "access by all people at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life." While welcoming the PM's resolve to ensure food security we shall have to bear in mind that although food security is not unattainable, it is at the same time very challenging because of a number of highly adverse factors that the country faces.
The key dimensions of food security challenges are: (i) food availability, (ii) access to food, and (iii) utilisation of food. Our discussion on challenges to food security in Bangladesh revolves around these dimensions.
Food availability is the first component of food security. In the context of Bangladesh, domestic food production is the most important component of food availability. Bangladesh has trebled her production of food grains, particularly rice, since independence, from approximately 100 lakh tonnes in 1971-72 to slightly over 3 crore tonnes in 2009-10.
But, can the present trend of food grain production meet the requirements of a burgeoning population? Population growth rate is outpacing food grain growth rate. In its "State of the World Population 2010" report, the UNFPA puts the present population of Bangladesh at 164.4 million (the government says the present population of the country is 146.0 million) and predicts that the country's population will be 220.2 million by 2050. While unveiling the aforesaid UNFPA report as chief guest, Food and Disaster Management Minister Abdur Razzaque reportedly said that the booming population would directly affect the food security of the country.
Building up sufficient stocks of food grains (rice and wheat) in government warehouses is considered indispensable for ensuring food security in Bangladesh. In recent days, the government failed to maintain the food grain stocks of 10 lakh tonnes prescribed by National Food Policy (NFP) 2006, which has sent a wrong signal to the market. Coarse rice is selling at Tk. 34-35 a kilogram, exposing the poor and the vulnerable to food insecurity.
The emphasis placed on rice production has resulted in increased dependency on imports for non-food grain commodities, such as, pulses, oil-seeds and fruits, which remain unaffordable to many consumers, especially poor consumers.
The proverbial "machhey bhatey Bangalee" is now a distant memory because of quick disappearance of farmland and water bodies. Against the demand for 10 million tonnes of vegetables, the current vegetable production in the country is around 2 million tonnes.
Climate change and global warming are going to pose a serious threat to the country's food security by adversely affecting food production. Agricultural scientists have predicted that the country's rice production will decrease by 8% and wheat by 32% by 2050 due to climate change. Other food constituents, including vegetables, pulses and fish would also be adversely affected due to climate change and global warming.
While addressing the 65th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 26, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina thus aptly said:"Bangladesh has been adversely affected by global warming. Food security is faced with serious threats due to climate change and global warming. Though our share of carbon emissions is negligible, we are its worst victims."
Availability of food grains or even food does not in itself guarantee food security for all households or individuals in the country. Even when aggregate food supplies are adequate, a number of factors prevent poor households or individuals from having access to required food. These, among others, are: (1) income poverty, and (2) insufficient food assistance.
Food security at household level is closely linked with income poverty. Around 40% of the population lives below poverty line, and this comes to about 60 million as per present total population estimated by the government. They lack adequate purchasing power for procurement of food. Income poverty, which causes food insecurity in the households, results mainly from (a) insufficient government and private sector investment in physical infrastructure, (b) little non-farming activities in rural areas, (c) poor wages of agricultural labour, (d) seasonal unemployment of agricultural labour, and (e) high prices of foodstuffs in comparison with the increase in income level of the poor.
The situation is the worst with the destitute, sick, old and infirm who are incapable of participating in income generating opportunities. According to National Food Policy Plan of Action (NFPPA) 2008, population in this category stands at 7.8%.
Although there has been some improvement in the system of food delivery to the poor, it remains inadequate to supplement their food acquisition capacity in order to enable them to have access to required food.
Utilisation of food, including its nutritional value, is another important component of food security. Various studies on utilisation of food, including utilisation at household level, show (a) inequality in intra-household food allocation, (b) dietary imbalance, and (c) loss of volume, quality and nutritional values because of improper storage, processing and cooking practices.
The PM definitely kept these challenges in view while expressing her government's resolve to ensure food security for "every person" in the country. Bangladesh has huge potential to increase food crop productivity, fisheries and livestock despite climate change effects if right policies are followed. The government should not be complacent with "rejection" of the UNFPA report on the country's current population growth rate and total population.
It must be admitted that the country's family planning programme, that had once drawn global appreciation for its success in reducing the annual population growth rate, has lost its way in recent years. The government has not been much attentive to the field-level service delivery to the eligible couples. This programme needs immediate reactivation. Minister Abdur Razzaque was right when he said: "Booming population will directly affect the food security of the country."
M. Abdul Latif Mondal is a former Secretary
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